道德品格的建構向來被視為個體的責任，但在主體有意識地選擇成為什麼樣子的人以前，其道德品格似已受習慣養成、道德教養的影響，而大致成形。就此
而言，我們如何能夠主張個體應為自身的道德品格負責？究竟在何種程度上，個體可為自身的道德品格承擔責任？本文即以「道德運氣」這個概念來指稱諸如外
在環境、道德教養、個人稟賦等對道德品格的型塑具有實質影響力，但卻屬於個人自主控制能力以外的因素。道德運氣對於「品格建構之個體責任」的挑戰，當
有助於釐清個體可為自身的道德品格負責的真正意涵與限度。明確而言，品格的建構既非為主體所能全然掌控，也非絲毫不受任何條件所囿限；品格建構本質上
就是一種協同合作的事業，無法由主體單獨完成。最後，透過 Aristotle關於自主性與責任的發展性觀點，可明確說明個體是如何擔負起品格建構的責任。
It has long been an unwritten rule that individuals are responsible for the development of their personal moral character. However, the way in which people typically develop moral character is often the result of habits and moral upbringing, which are imposed before individuals start to shape their moral character by conscious effort. If this is the case, an individual should not be held completely responsible for his or her own moral character. This paper draws on the idea of “moral luck” to designate non-voluntary variables such as one’s background, circumstances, upbringing, temperament, and other similar factors, which one cannot control but which can have substantial influence on the formation of moral character. Moral luck and its challenge to the notion that one must always be responsible for his or her own moral character helps to clarify the degree to which one should be held responsible for his or her own moral character. This paper concludes that the formation of moral character is not entirely under the control of an individual. Instead, it can be impacted by a wide variety of conditions; the formation of one’s character cannot be solely accomplished by the nature of one’s individual actions, but is rather a collaborative process. Lastly, this paper specifies how one can take responsibility for his or her own character based on an Aristotelian developmental conception of voluntariness and personal responsibility.
APA 格式
陳伊琳(Yi-Lin Chen)（2013年12月31日），〈可要求個人為品格負責嗎？道德運氣對於個體品格責任的挑戰〉。《教育研究集刊》，2014年03月10日取自
MLA 格式
陳伊琳(Yi-Lin Chen)，〈可要求個人為品格負責嗎？道德運氣對於個體品格責任的挑戰〉。《教育研究集刊》第 59 期（2013），取自
第五十九輯．第三期 - 2013-09-30
